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MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID E. BATES,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

-vsCase No, 890430-CA
Priority No. 14b

CHRISTINE L. BATES,
Defendant/Appellant.

COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT and submits the following
as his brief in the appeal of the above-captioned action:
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals to
decide the appeal in this action pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78 2a-3 (1987) and pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Smamit County, State of Utah,
terminating plaintiff's alimony obligation to the defendant.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in modifying a

divorce decree by terminating alimony originally awarded to the
defendant/appellant in the Decree of Divorce?

2.

Did the trial court err in reducing the appellant's

interest in the retirement accounts*
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no statutes or case law authorities thought by
respondent to be determinative of this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent filed a petition to modify the Decree of Divorce
in this action seeking termination of his alimony obligation
because

the

early

availability

of

retirement

funds

appellant constituted a material change in circumstance.

to

the

A trial

was held before the honorable J. Dennis Frederick/ District Court
Judge, in the Third Judicial District: Court in and for Summit
County.

Judge Frederick found that there had been a material

change in circumstances and thereby terminated alimony.
The parties were divorced on July 8, 1986.

At the time the

Decree was entered, the respondent was an airline pilot for
Western Airlines.
respondent
month.

was

At

earning

the time the Decree was entered
Six Thousand

Dollars

the

($6,000.00) per

The appellant, at the time the Decree was entered, was

earning Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($680.00) per month.
The trial court awarded the appellant 1,423.45 shares of
Western Airlines

stock, One Thousand Dollars

($1,000-00) per

month as alimony, an interest in respondent's retirement, "Plan
A,M in the sum of Twenty-Two Thousand Two Hundred Twelve Dollars
and Fifty Cents ($22,212.50), and an interest in respondent's
retirement, "Plan B," in the sum of Ninety-Six Thousand Seven
Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars and Fifty Cents ($96,747.50).
The respondent, at. the time the Decree was entered, could
2

not collect his retirement unless he retired, and appellant could
not collect
retired.

her

interest

in his retirement until

respondent

Therefore, the appellant did not have access to these

funds and could not receive these funds until respondent retired.
Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, Delta Airlines
purchased Western Airlines.

This purchase altered the terms of

respondent'a retirement plan and appellant xs now enabled to have
immediate access to these funds, in cash, without retirement by
her former husband.
Iu

1988, respondent

filed

a

petition

for

modification

alleging that the availability of the retirement accounts to the
appellant constituted a material change in circumstances which
would justify the termination of alimony.
At the time the petition foe modification was heard, the
appellant was working part-time
Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars
school full-time.

as a secretary, earning Six

($625.00) per month and attending

Her expenses h^d increased only slightly since

the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
At the same time, the responient's income was between Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) and Elev3n Thousand Four Hundred
Dollars ($11,400.00) per month.
increased also.

The respon lent's expenses had

The respondent had not convoyed the 1,423.45

shares oE Western Airlines stock to the appellant.
The Court found the value of the 1423.4C> chares of stock to
be Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) and ordered that to be
released

to the

availability

of

appellant.
the

The Count also

retirement

account

to

found that the
the

appellant

constituted a substantial and material change in circumstance.
3

The Court awarded One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in
immediate cash to the appellant for her interest in respondent's
rotirement plans "A" and "B" and terminated alimony.
During all times relevant herein, respondent has had the
sole care, custody

and control cf the parries' three minor

children and has nevar been awarded support for these children
from their mother, the appellant.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGnMEBT
1.

The lower court did not abuse its discretion by finding

that a material change had occurred
alimony.

and thereby terminating

The fact that the retirement funds were accessible to

the appellant constituted a substantial change in circumstance.
2.

The

lower

court

did

.ot abuse

its discretion by

"reducing" the appellant's share of the retirement funds that
were awarded to her in the divorce decree.

The lower court

properl/ based its decision upon the future value of the One
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in comparison to the flat
sum of about One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($118,000.00)
that the appellant was to receive at the time the respondent
retired, potentially years in the future.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Trial

courts

have

considerable

divorcing parties' financial interests.

discretion

to

adjust

This discretionary power

to fashion an equitable property division extends equally to
subsequent modifications of an earlier decree.
Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988).

Throckmorton v.
The trial court's

actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.

Absent a

showing of a clear abuse of discretion, the appellate court will
4

defer to the judgment of the trial court, due to its advantaged
pos ition.
A court may modify a prior divorce decree; however, the
moving

party

must

establish

a

"substantial

change

of

circumstances which was not within the original contemplation of
the parties or the court at the time the original decree was
rendered."

Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985).
ARGUMENT

POTNT I:

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR TN FINDING THE
AVAILABILITY OF THE RETIREMENT FUNDS TO THE
APPEI.IANT TO BE A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH JUSTIFIED THE TERMINATION OF ALIMONY.

The original divorce decree clearly states that appellant
was not to receive her share of the retirement funds until the
respondent retired.

At the time of the decree, the trial judge

did not take into consideration that the appellant had immediate
access to these funds, because she did not then have access to
the funds.

It was clearly within the discretion of the lower

court to consider whether this One Hundred
($100,000.00) distribution

Thousand

Dollars

in immediate cash has so improved

appellant's financial situation that the termination of alimony
is proper.
The Utah courts have often articulated that the purpose of
alimony is "to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible
at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to
prevent the wife from becoming a public charrje."
Martinez, 754 P.2d

69, 74

(Utah App. 1988).

Martinez v.

The Court has

reiterated the three factors that must be considered by a trial
court in determining support.

Those factors are as follows:
5

(1) the financial conditions and needs of the requesting spouse,
(2) the ability of the requesting spouse to provide a sufficient
income for him or herself, and
spouse to provide support.
(Utah App. 1988).

(3) the ability of the other

Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958

Consideration of these factors in the instant

case demonstrates the modification of the divorce decree was not
an abuse of discretion of the lower court.
The first factor is the financial condition and needs of the
party seeking alimony.

It is clear that these retirement funds

were not immediately available to the appellant at the time
alimony

was

awarded.

significant assets.
current position.

She

had

a

low

income

and

no other

This is very different from appellant's
With immediate access to the One Hundred

Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in retirement funds, the appellant
is

in

a

significantly

improved

financial

situation.

The

investment of these funds would greatly add to the appellant's
monthly income, yielding income of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00)
per month if invested at a rate of return as low as six percent
(6%) per annum.

Furthermore, since the decree was entered, the

expenses of the appellant have increased only slightly.

Most

importantly, the appellant does not have the responsibility to
provide any child support to the respondent, even though the law
requires that both parents are responsible for the support of
their children.
The
appellant

second

factor

to produce

to

consider

a sufficient

is

the

income

ability

of

for herself.

the
The

appellant is able to work full-time, which would increase her
salary so that she can meet her own living expenses.
6

Appellant

is capable of earning Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) per month.
Appellant will also be receiving interest from the proceeds of
the retirement funds and stock to add to her monthly income.

At

an interest rate of eight percent (8%) per annum, appellant can
increase her income by approximately Seven Hundred Ninety Dollars
($790.00) per month, by investing both the One Hundred Thousand
Dollars

($100,000.00)

of

retirement

money

and

the

Eighteen

Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) of stock funds.
The third factor to consider is the respondent's ability to
provide support.

The current earnings of the respondent are

between Ten Thousand Dollars
Four

Hundred

Dollars

($10,000.00) and Eleven Thousand

($11,400.00),

gross, per

month.

The

respondent has the ability to provide support to the appellant.
However, the respondent's expenses have gone up since the divorce
decree was issued.

Most importantly, it is the respondent who is

the sole provider for the parties' three children and he will
continue to be the sole provider.

The court appropriately left

his income in his home for the care of the children, for whom
their mother, the appellant, provides no support.
The appellant states that the trial
consider pertinent

circumstances when

judge is charged to

awarding alimony.

The

Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1985), considered
the assets that were awarded to the wife when considering her
financial

condition.

The

assets

that

were

awarded

to the

appellant herein were taken into consideration by the trial judge
at the original trial.

The original trial court was plainly

aware of the fact that the retirement funds were not immediately
accessible to the appellant.

Therefore, when awarding alimony,
7

it was appropriate that the court did not place any weight on
this asset in calculating what was immediately available to the
appellant for her support.

However, it must also have been in

the contemplation of the original trial judge that the funds
would be available when the husband retired and that concurrent
with his retirement he would suffer a loss in income and be
entitled to reduce or terminate alimony.

This logical process

has only been accelerated.
The
factors

trial
when

court

appropriately

terminating

alimony.

considered

all

The availability

relevant
of the

retirement funds was clearly a substantial change of circumstance
that warranted the termination of alimony.
POINT II: THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN "REDUCING*
APPELLANT'S SHARE IN THE RETIREMENT FUNDSThe appellant

claims

that the doctrine of res

judicata

applies in divorce action.

Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767

P.2d

1988).

121,

123

(Utah

App.

This

Court

stated,

in

Throckmorton, that "the application of res judicata is unique in
divorce actions because of their equitable doctrine which allows
courts to reopen alimony, support or property division if the
moving

party

can

demonstrate

a

substantial

change

of

circumstances since the matter was previously considered by the
court."

Supra.

In this case, the moving party, the respondent, demonstrated
before the lower court that there had been a substantial change
in circumstance.

Upon proof that there had been substantial

change, it was well within the power of the lower court to make
changes that are equitable.
8

The 1906 divorce decree slated that the appellant was to
receive a flat One Hundred Eighteen Tliousand Nine Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($118,950.00) share in the retirement funds held by the
respondent.

This share was non-interest-bearing.

Accordingly,

the appellant was not going to receive her share of these funds
until

the

respondent

retired

at

some

potentially more than ten years away.

time

in

the

future,

At the time the decree of

divorce was entered, a speci fic date was not set on which the
appelJant was to receive the proceeds.
At the time of the modification, in 1989, respondent was
approximately 51 years of age.

Judge Frederick found that the

"reduction1' in appellant's interest in the retirement funds was
appropriate based upon the present and future value of the One
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), along with the assumption
that

respondent

can continue

to work

until

age

60.

There

existed, at the time of the modification trial, the substantial
possibility that the appellant would not receive her funds for
another

nine years

under

the old

order.

Tf the

appellant

received a share of One Hundx^ed Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00)
today, with earnings at a rate of eight per<:unt (8%), compounded
only annually, over a nine-year peiiod, the One Hundred Thousand
Dollars

($100,000.00) will have doubled.

The appellant can

realize an increase of over Eighty Thousand Dollacs ($80,000.00),
in excess of the amount due her under the decree, if she receives
those funds in 1989.

It is the respondent who will suffer the

loss tvhen this amount is removed from the retirement account.

If

the respondent were to leave this amount in his retirement fund
until ht* retired, he would realise a significant Increase in the
9

value

of

the

account

to him,

since appellant would

not be

entitled to receive any of the interest accrued during this
period.
The

appellant

is

receiving

an

actual

value

of

Eighty

Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00) or more over and above what she was
entitled to receive under the original divorce decree.

The trial

court did not abuse its discretion by "reducing" the amount that
appellant was to receive from the respondent's retirement funds.
CONCLUSION
The trial court had discretion to modify the divorce decree
based upon a substantial ch~. ge in circumstance.

The trial court

properly

found that a substantial change in circumstance had

occurred

and,

appellant.

therefore, properly

terminated

alimony

to the

The trial court also used its discretion to "reduce"

the appellant's share of the respondent's retirement fund to One
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), now, or a future value of
almost double what she would have otherwise been entitled to
receive nine years from now.

Based upon the fact that the

appellant will receive more than was awarded to her in the
original divorce decree, this decision was also proper.
The modification order should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 17th day of October, 1989.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C/CQgPORON
Attorjfey for Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY

that

I am employed

in the offices of

Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the respondent herein, and
that I caused the foregoing Brief of Respondent to be served upon
appellant by placing hand-delivering four true and correct copies
of the same to:
EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Appellant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah
on the 17th day of October, 1989.

MARY C. CORPOI
Attorney'Tor Plaintiff/Respondent

11

